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From Rosenberger to Martinez: Why the Rise of
Hyper-Modernism is a Bad Thing for Religious
Freedom
Perhaps the news of modernity's death, accompanied by the sup-
posed advent of postmodernity, has been greatly exaggerated?'
Throughout the last two decades, many scholars have opined about the
rise of postmodernism and its impact on religion, specifically the First
Amendment's Religion Clause.' One commentator asks, "If the sun is
setting on the Enlightenment while postmodernism rises in the evening
sky, what becomes of religious freedom in America?"' Most scholars
agree that the transition from modern to postmodern has diminished the
principle of church-state separation as a driving force in recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence. Instead, the Enlightenment's "crown jewel" of
church-state separation is now merely a competing orthodoxy.' Before,
liberalism marginalized religion for operating outside the bounds of ra-
tional discourse. Today, postmodern thought places liberalism on the
same playing field as religion, both jockeying for position in public dis-
course. This concept of a postmodern era seemed well established until
the summer of 2010 when the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Christian Legal Society ("CLS") v. Martinez.5
In the context of public universities, a true postmodernist would
encourage student religious groups to obtain equal access to public facil-
ities, funding, and rational discourse. This postmodern sensibility is
most clearly reflected in the Supreme Court's Rosenberger decision.6
However, while many scholars continue to proclaim the rise of postmo-
1. JAMES K.A. SMITH, INTRODUCING RADICAL ORTHODOXY: MAPPING A POST-SECULAR
THEOLOGY 31-32 (Baker Academic 2004).
2. For purposes of this Comment, I will refer to both the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause together as the "Religion Clause." However, as discussed infra
1(E), there are notable differences between postmodernism's impact on the interpretation
of the Establishment Clause, as distinguished from the Free Exercise Clause.
3. Hunter Baker, Competing Orthodoxies in the Public Square: Postmodernism's Effect
on Church-State Separation, 20J. L. & REL. 97, 99 (2004-2005).
4. Id.
5. Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
Oral arguments were heard on April 19, 2010, and the opinion was filed on June 28,
2010.
6. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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dernism, the Court's recent decision in CLS v. Martinez reflects a sharp
departure from postmodern thought and a crystallization of hyper-
modernism.
This Comment will argue that what has been flying under the ban-
ner of "postmodernism" is actually an intensification of modem para-
digms. Moreover, hyper-modernism is not a friend to religious freedom.
Instead, the Court held in Martinez that the ideologies of "diversity,"
"non-discrimination," and "non-commitment" trump religious freedom.'
Postmodernists and Christians alike should find this objectionable. Ad-
ditionally, the Martinez decision raises serious questions about the so-
called rise of postmodern thought and its impact, at least in the minds of
all nine Supreme Court justices. This decision may only mark the be-
ginning of a rise in hyper-modern Religion Clause jurisprudence. At the
outset, it is helpful to provide a background to modernism and postmo-
dernism and their impact on religious freedom.
I. LIBERALISM, POSTMODERNISM, AND RELIGION
Most scholars mark the rise of postmodernism with the fall of mod-
ernism and loss of confidence in modern civilization, technology, social
regimentation, and rational planning.' Before discussing the postmo-
dern mind, it is important to explain what it claims to transcend: the
modern.
7. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2991-94.
8. GENE EDWARD VEITH, JR., POSTMODERN TIMES: A CHRISTIAN GUIDE TO
CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT AND CULTURE 40 (Marvin Olasky ed., Crossway Books 1994).
In fact, many scholars mark the fall of modernism with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
dualistic division of the Eastern and Western civilizations. Id. at 27 (quoting THOMAS C.
ODEN, Two WORLDS: NOTES ON THE DEATH OF MODERNITY IN AMERICA AND RUSSIA 32 (In-
terVarsity Press 1992)). Specifically, postmodernism critiques the West's failure of the
social sciences and ambitious government programs to achieve their promise. Postmo-
dernism can also be attributed to the counterculture movement. Id. at 40. One scholar
noted that our "cultural mood turned sour" as we began to realize that the notion of
progress was a fallacy. DAVID WELLS, ABOVE ALL EARTHLY Pow'RS: CHRIST IN A
POSTMODERN WORLD 40 (Eerdmans Publishing 2005). Thus, it was the sourness that
sprouted the postmodern mood, a rebellion of modern goals. Id.
700 [Vol. 33:699
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A. The Modern Mind'
In the beginning, "[m]odernity started out to conquer the world in
the name of [rleason." 0 Modernity also "questions all conventional
ways of doing things, substituting tradition with its own more reliable
authorities of science, economic growth, democracy, and law."" The pe-
riod of modernity is commonly referred to as the Enlightenment.' The
cornerstone of the Enlightenment emphasized "reason" as the best guide
for earthly matters. 13 Reason permits an individual to survey "the world
from a vantage point outside the flux of history,"" The "Enlightenment
mind" would agree that knowledge is "certain, objective, and good." 5
Meanwhile, appeals to external, unverifiable authority (i.e., revealed
truth) should be treated with great skepticism.16
B. Modernism's Politics of Early Liberalism
The Enlightenment set the stage for liberal democracy and the no-
tion of church-state separation. Early classical liberalism is commonly
referred to as the politics of modernism." Michael McConnell argues,
"[w]e tend to forget that liberalism was born of concerns about reli-
gion."'8 Many early political thinkers of liberalism struggled with the is-
9. For purposes of this Comment, I will use the words "Enlightenment," "modern-
ism," and "liberalism" interchangeably. However, there is arguably a notable distinction
between modernism and liberalism. Generally, liberalism is often referred to as the polit-
ical manifestation of modernism and more narrowly focuses on the specific notions of
"individual freedom" and "autonomy." SMITH, supra note 1, at 60 n.113. Liberalism is
committed to individual freedom as the "good," and endorses political autonomy and
epistemological autonomy. Id. Meanwhile, modernism embraces liberalism and more
broad notions of reason as good.
10. DAVID LYON, CONCEPTS IN SOCIAL THOUGHT: POSTMODERNITY 27 (University of
Minnesota Press 1999).
11. Id.
12. Baker, supra note 3, at 98.
13. Id. at 99.
14. STANLEY GRENz, A PRIMER ON POSTMODERNISM 4 (Eerdmans Publishing 1996)
(quoting Merold Westphal, The Ostrich and the Boogeyman: Placing Postmodernism, 20
CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR'S REV. 115 (1990)).
15. Id.
16. Baker, supra note 3, at 100 (citing GRENZ, supra note 14, at 4).
17. Michael W. McConnell, 'God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!': Freedom of Reli-
gion in the Post-modern Age, 1993 BYU L. REv. 163, 166, 186 (1993).
18. Id.
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sues of religion and government." For example, John Locke warned in
his Letter Concerning Toleration:
I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business
of civil government from that of religion and to settle the just bounds
that lie between the one and the other. If this be not done, there can be
no end put to the controversies that will be always arising."20
For Locke and many other early thinkers, freedom of religion was a cor-
nerstone of early liberalism.2' Above all, liberalism "meant that every
person has the freedom to worship God in accordance with the dictates
of his own conscience."22 With that said, liberalism also meant that "re-
ligion should be separated from public life so that all citizens may partic-
ipate in government predicated on the employment of common reason
that everyone possesses."23
The influence of early liberalism has been most fully achieved in the
United States, where many citizens and courts have argued that this
country was founded upon the principle of church-state separation. The
Founders' conception of religious freedom is most eloquently articulated
by James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assess-
ments, which recognizes:
It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and
such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent
both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil So-
ciety.24
Madison identifies that we have separate duties to God and civil society,
and those duties should be performed in separate spheres. This notion
is clearly realized in the Religion Clause of the First Amendment.
McConnell argues, "No one would have said that liberalism at the time
of the Founding was inconsistent with or hostile to religious freedom,
for religious freedom was one of its principal commitments and preoc-
cupations."25 But, as early liberalism developed into an ideology, it de-
19. Id. at 166-67.
20. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), reprinted in JOHN LOCKE:
A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION IN Focus 17 (John Horton & Susan Mendus eds.,
Routledge 1991).
21. McConnell, supra note 17, at 167.
22. Id.
23. Baker, supra note 3, at 101.
24. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
§ 1 (1785), reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 64 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
25. McConnell, supra note 17, at 172; see also Michael W. McConnell, The Origins
and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1431-
702 [Vol. 33:699
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parted from its so-called religious roots."6 Or maybe Locke's liberal doc-
trine of toleration, which allegedly set the stage for religious freedom,
took on a new, distorted, meaning. The question is whether a rise in
postmodernism or hyper-modernism is to blame.
C. The Postmodern Mind
Postmodernism has been termed the "anti-Enlightenment" because
it represents a new way of thinking, which calls into question the beliefs
of linear progress, absolute truth, and the standardization of know-
ledge.27 From the postmodern viewpoint, "knowledge no longer appears
to be certain" and individuals are "incapable of viewing the world objec-
tively, but instead live in a cage constructed of [their] own experiences,
culture, language, and temperament."" A postmodern mind resembles
the following general assertions: (1) the world is read differently by
those who encounter it; (2) the world is an arena of dueling texts;
(3) reason is not the only valid way of knowing; other valid ways of
knowing include intuition, emotion, and revelation; (4) there is no abso-
lute truth, instead truth is relative to the community to which we be-
long; and (5) personal autonomy is not necessarily the greatest good, but
the community will self-define what is best.29
Tolerance of all beliefs and ideologies is the "golden rule" of post-
modernity.30 Once any claim to universal moral norms is stricken, the
only value that remains is the notion of tolerance or passive willingness
to accept anything as true for that person.3 ' Given all of the choices in
the West today, along with the awareness of difference, diversity, plural-
32 (1990). It is also important to note that broad coalition of the founding generation
supported the disestablishment of religion. Richard Bowser & Robin Muse, Historical
Perspectives on Church and State, in CHURCH-STATE ISSUES IN AMERICA TODAY: RELIGION
AND GOVERNMENT 43 (Ann W. Duncan & Steven L. Jones eds., Praeger 2008). During
the founding era, there were at least four distinct views of religion and society, those in-
cluding: (1) Puritan, (2) Evangelical, (3) Enlightenment, and (4) Civic Republican. Id.
While their underlying motivations for separating religion from the State was diverse,
these groups did reach some degree of compromise in the creation of the Religion
Clause. See id.
26. McConnell, supra note 17, at 172.
27. GRENZ, supra note 14, at 42.
28. Baker, supra note 3, at 97-98.
29. Id. at 102 (citing GRENZ, supra note 14, at 11).
30. Mark Liederbach, Natural Law and the Problem of Postmodern Epistemology, 2 LIB.
U. L. REv. 781, 791 (2008).
31. Id.
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ism, and plasticity of life, "it seems highly implausible that there is any
such metanarrative, any such central and single meaning, or viable and
compelling worldview."3 2 Instead, "one's personal conscience and per-
sonal convictions (or those of the community he or she belongs to)
ought to become the chief sources of moral authority and autonomy."33
This idea has been identified as the core of the postmodern worldview.
D. The Impact of Postmodernism: Good or Bad for Christians?
Michael McConnell credits postmodernism for the "exposure of li-
beralism as just another ideology."3 ' Additionally, postmodernism al-
lows religion to "reenter the serious world of intellectual inquiry on a
presumptively equal footing - one belief against another, and let us see
which offers the most persuasive account of the human expe-
rience. .. ."3 The Enlightenment view assumed that God could not be
properly foundational to one's thought because his existence was im-
possible to prove by empirical evidence.3 6  Furthermore, in science, it
was taboo to mention God when discussing the origins of the universe."
Now, postmodernism calls to abandon every type of foundationalism,
which allows for Christian theology to "reassert its right to live and think
on its own terms."3 Postmodernism will deconstruct the critical appara-
tus that was developed to undermine the Christian story as intrinsically
32. WELLS, supra note 8, at 78.
33. Liederbach, supra note 30, at 791 (recognizing that "[o]nce this move is made,
the erosion of any claim to universal moral norms (and thus even the first principles of
natural law) are completely undercut"). As Liederbach noted, a postmodern world may
endanger universal truth claims of "the eternal law of God" and "the will of God." Id.
This may be a legitimate concern for Christians.
34. McConnell, supra note 17, at 182. McConnell summarizes the postmodern
viewpoint as believing that "[tihere is no neutral, objective vantage point from which to
view the world; we are all prisoners of our own perspectives; the beginning of wisdom is
to recognize the potential worth and value of others different from ourselves." Id. As a
result, liberalism is not neutral, but rather is the carrier of its own substantive principles,
which include individualism, independence, and rationality. Id. at 186.
35. Id. at 182.
36. WELLS, supra note 8, at 82.
37. Id. at 72.
38. Id. at 84. Wells also warns that a non-foundationalist theology surrenders its
claim of having universal significance, which may be an undesirable byproduct of post-
modernism. Id. Can Christianity be content with only being a fragment of the whole, by
being one competing ideology in a sea of voices?
704 [Vol. 33:699
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inferior to the present." As a result, McConnell suggests that postmo-
dernism will invite a more free understanding of religious freedom and
"religious ways of thought could be restored to legitimacy and cease to
be marginalized."'
To the contrary, many people view postmodernism as a threat to re-
ligion. Specifically, there is a concern that the shift from modernity to
the postmodern places an emphasis on tolerance of religion, rather than
free exercise of religion." As a result, "tolerant neutrality manifests itself
by imposing a requirement of secularity in the public sphere, requiring
religious individuals to keep their faith to themselves."" Under the
postmodern lens, Christianity is not part of the search for truth, but in-
stead "becomes just another expression of individual belief entitled to no
more protection than any other secularized expression."
For many Christians, postmodern thought seems threatening be-
cause it stands to reject absolute truth. Most Christians, regardless of
denomination, would agree that the Word of God is an absolute truth.
For Christians, the Bible is a super-text and postmodernism does not
recognize super-texts." However, postmodernism does not rule out re-
ligion, as modernity tended to do." Instead, today, religion is seen as a
preference. Morality is viewed as a desire, not a truth. 6 Therefore, I can
desire to believe in the saving grace of Jesus Christ and that belief will be
truth (to me). The postmodernist cannot critique my preference to fol-
low Christianity as truth and my own moral compass. Instead, in a
postmodern world, any way of thinking must be considered as "good" as
any other worldview.4 ' Gene Edward Veith noted that "[wihereas mod-
ernism sought to rid the world of religion, postmodernism spawns new
ones."48  Many Christian thinkers express excitement about the new-
39. Liederbach, supra note 30, at 72; see also PAUL LAKELAND, POSTMODERNITY:
CHRISTIAN IDENTITY IN A FRAGMENTED AGE (Fortress Press 1997).
40. McConnell, supra note 25, at 183; Liederbach, supra note 29, at 72 (recognizing
that there is a "new prospect" for Christian thought in a postmodern world).
41. Matthew McNeil, The First Amendment Out on Highway 61: Bob Dylan, RLUIPA,
and the Problem with Emerging Postmodern Religion Clause jurisprudence, 65 OHIo ST. LJ.
1021, 1042 (2004) (citing McConnell, supra note 24).
42. Id. at 1042-43.
43. Id. at 1043.
44. GRENZ, supra note 14, at 11.
45. VEITH supra note 8, at 193.
46. Id. at 195.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 198.
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found potential for Christian thought in a postmodern age." However,
it is worth noting that postmodern sensibilities will also likely lead to in-
creased segmentation of society, religious groups, and the Church.
While it seems postmodernism, as compared to modernism, is more
likely to accommodate the Christian worldview, we should be aware of
the limits of postmodernism."o Christians will be shunned for "thinking
they have the only truth" and they will be condemned for "trying to force
their beliefs on everybody else."" When Christians cross that line, they
should "expect to be excluded from postmodernists' invocations of toler-
ance and pluralism."" Additionally, there is a legitimate fear that post-
modernism will treat religion as a mere "commodity," a product to be
consumed in an increasingly consumer-driven world." With regards to
Christianity's place in the marketplace of ideologies, the "opportunities
are endless, and the quest for new market niches" are constant.5 1 Con-
sumerism knows no boundaries; values and beliefs "seem to lose any
sense of coherence, let alone continuity, in a world of consumer
choice."" Many fear that if Christianity succumbs to consumerism in
this postmodern era, it will become a mere "leisure pursuit," which indi-
viduals simply buy into on a whim. 6 Indeed, this has the effect of plura-
lizing and fragmenting Christianity, which may be a legitimate concern
for Christians.
If postmodernism is rightly associated with an intensified consumer
culture, then Christianity's place in a postmodem world can be analo-
gized to a box of Cheerios on the cereal aisle at the grocery store. A con-
sumer strolls the aisle, searching through hundreds of different brands of
cereal, all deserving of their own placement on the shelf. Similarly, a
postmodernist views Christianity as just another ideology on the shelf.
This may raise concern for Christians who will be discontent with the
characterization of Christianity as a mere commodity. Christianity is
more that just a mere ideology, it is a way of living. In a general sense, it
49. WELLS, supra note 8, at 73 (noting that Thomas Oden has spoken "exhuberantly"
about the possibility of postmodern theology). Also, Stanley Grenz is making attempts
to rewrite the evangelical faith in terms compatible with the emerging postmodern ethos.
Id.
50. VEITH , supra note 8, at 222-23.
51. Id. at 223.
52. Id.
53. WELLS, supra note 8, at 77.
54. LYON, supra note 10, at 71.
55. Id. at 76-77.
56. Id.
[Vol. 33:699706
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seems as though Christianity loses its significance if it is analogized to
box of Cheerios on the cereal aisle at the grocery store.
E. Postmodernism and the Religion Clause
The contemporary shift to a postmodern era leads to the rejection of
modernist dichotomies, which necessarily calls for a change in the voca-
bulary of Religion Clause jurisprudence." Indeed, the Enlightenment-
minded metaphor of the "wall of separation" has been replaced by the
"public square."" The wall of separation was built on the modernist no-
tion that reason (i.e., law) and religion are opposites." As the wall has
been criticized and ultimately destroyed, postmodernism now views law
and religion as competing orthodoxies in the public square. One scholar
noted that the public square "contemplates shared space" where religious
claims are "equally represented" in public education.60 in other words,
religion is now allowed to contribute to the rational discourse in a post-
modern era. As a result, one would expect the Religion Clause to be in-
terpreted in a manner to satisfy that expectation. Accordingly, the Es-
tablishment Clause would be interpreted narrowly to offer expanded
protection to religious groups.
It is important to note that a postmodernist would not utilize the
Free Exercise Clause to accommodate religious voices in the public
square. In the public square, postmodernism does not recognize claims
to privilege based on the special nature of religion, as compared to other
secular voices.6 1 In a true postmodern era, religious groups will be una-
ble to gain exemptions from neutral laws by relying on the Free Exercise
Clause." It would be improper to allow a competing orthodoxy to
"stand out from the pack" by asserting religion as a justification to be
treated differently. Indeed, the Employment Division v. Smith decision
exemplifies this concept by holding that a religious claimant receives no
protection under the Free Exercise Clause, unless he can show an addi-
57. Ruti G. Teitel, New Directions in Religious Liberty: Postmodernist Architectures in
the Law of Religion, 1993 BYU L. REV. 97, 101 (1993).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 99.
60. Id. at 106-07.
61. Baker, supra note 3, at 120.
62. See id.
63. Id.
707
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tional and separate constitutional violation.6 Accordingly, religious
groups should not rely on the Free Exercise Clause in a postmodern
world, but instead proceed under the Free Speech Clause if they desire
religious freedom in the public square.
II. POSTMODERNISM OR HYPER-MODERNISM?
While postmodernism may be described as transcending modern-
ism, some scholars argue that there is a deep continuity between the
modern and "supposedly" postmodern.65 David Wells warns, "[Wie
should not be too hasty in declaring the complete overthrow of the En-
lightenment regime" because "important threads of continuity between
modernity and postmodernity exist."66 Thus, what flies under the ban-
ner of postmodern is really just hyper-modernism. 67 David Lyon points
out that "within the ranks of sociologists one can find both disagreement
about whether our social condition is 'postmodernity' or 'high,' 'late,'
'radicalized,' or 'reflexive' modernity."68 James K.A. Smith recognizes
that "[wihile it may be that the foundationalist paradigms of modernity
have largely collapsed, the dogma concerning the autonomy of theoreti-
cal thought has not really been dislodged in postmodernity."61 In partic-
ular, Smith argues that postmodernism actually emphasizes the "idol of
freedom," which was generated by the modern ideal of political autono-
my. 70 If "all moderns are liberals," then Smith suggests, "all postmoderns
are [also] liberals."n
Emphasis on freedom is the most noteworthy continuity between
modernism and postmodernism. Additionally, both modernity and
postmodernity are characterized by an idolatrous notion of self-
64. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990); see also Baker, supra
note 3, at 120.
65. SMITH, supra note 1, at 92.
66. WELLS, supra note 8, at 67.
67. Id. (citing CONOR CUNNINGHAM, RADICAL ORTHODOXY: A NEW THEOLOGY 64-90
(Routledge 2002)); Michael Hanby, Desire: Augustine Beyond Western Subjectivity in
RADICAL ORTHODOXY: A NEW THEOLOGY 109-26 (John Milbank et al. eds., Routledge
2002); John Milbank, Sublimity: The Modern Transendent in RELIGION MODERNITY, AND
POSTMODERNITY 258-84 (Paul Heelas et al. eds., Blackwell 1998).
68. LYON, supra note 10, at 105.
69. SMITH, supra note 1, at 139-40.
70. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
71. Id.
708 [Vol. 33:699
10
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 12
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol33/iss3/12
20111 THE RISE OF HYPER-MODERNISM & RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
72
sufficiency and deep naturalism, largely because both deny grace.
Wells also suggests that "[tihe autonomous self is a thread that comes
into the postmodern era from the modern."" It is this cultural reality
that "belies the thought that the postmodern is completely postmodern.""
In a true postmodern world, there is no central authority, which is the
overriding thought, holding the world together.7 ' Therefore, some scho-
lars conclude that postmodernism is merely an "intensification" of mod-
ernity, particularly with respect to liberal notions of freedom.
This critique of postmodernism raises the following question: Do
recent Supreme Court cases reflect postmodern or hyper-modern para-
digms? This Comment largely presumes that the notion of "freedom in
the public square" is a postmodern principle; however, it is important to
note that such a principle has modern origins. That is not to say post-
modernism is a sham, merely disguised to hide modern notions. Even
Smith concludes that postmodernism only emphasizes certain paradigms
of modernism.
Most importantly, the notion of freedom has been intensified (hy-
per-modernized) under the so-called reign of postmodernism. Moreo-
ver, a postmodernist would find it objectionable if one ideology
(i.e., non-discrimination, non-commitment, and diversity) attacked and
constrained another ideology (i.e., Christian statement of faith). As
Stanley Fish warns, "to say that all beliefs should be respected equally is
to do nothing more than embrace one of the competing orthodoxies (li-
beralism) making a play for power to guide the body politic." As dis-
cussed infra, this ideology of non-discrimination in the public square is
gaining force and beginning to swallow any other ideologies that may
disagree or fail to play by the rules. Postmodernism presumes that liber-
al notions no longer play "referee," but instead become competing or-
72. JAMES K.A. SMITH, WHO's AFRAID OF POSTMODERNISM?: TAKING DERRIDA, LYOTARD,
AND FOUCAULT TO CHURCH 26 (Baker Academic 2006) (citing GRAHAM HUGHES, WORSHIP
AS MEANING: A LITURGICAL THEOLOGY FOR LATE MODERNITY 2 (Cambridge University
Press 2003)) (recognizing that both modernity and postmodernity are characterized by a
trenchant "disenchantment of the world").
73. WELLS, supra note 8, at 248.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 249.
76. SMITH, supra note 72, at 26.
77. Id. at 20 n.8.
78. Baker, supra note 3, at 108 (citing Stanley Fish, A Reply to Judd Owen, 93 AM.
POLITICAL Sa. REV. 925, 929 (1999)).
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thodoxies." Turning to an analysis of recent jurisprudence, this Com-
ment will analyze reflections of postmodernism and then expose the hy-
per-modern trend where the Supreme Court has allowed liberal notions
to play referee and achieve supremacy in the so-called public square.
III. POSTMODERNISM REFLECTED IN ROSENBERGER AND ITS PROGENy8 o
There is apparent evidence that recent United States Supreme Court
decisions reflect a postmodern sensibility. As one scholar noted, "per-
haps the single finest example of the transition from modern to postmo-
dern in the Court's opinions can be seen in the hallmark Rosenberger v.
University of Virginia decision."
A. Rosenberger and Similar Cases: Religion Clause or Free Speech
Clause?
In Rosenberger, the University of Virginia set up a student activities
fund to support extracurricular student activities. Some religious
groups were expressly prohibited from receiving funds if they promoted
a "particular belief in or about a deity."' Meanwhile, Ron Rosenberger
and a group of students created a publishing magazine dealing with
Christian issues." When Rosenberger and the magazine requested that
the school pay their printing from the student activities fund, the school
denied the request on the grounds that the publication was an imper-
missible "religious activity.""
Ron Rosenberger and the Christian magazine sued the University of
Virginia for constitutional violations, including free speech and free ex-
ercise claims among others." The Supreme Court held that the universi-
ty had created a limited public forum through the student activities
fund, and then had unlawfully performed viewpoint discrimination
against the magazine by denying funding on the basis of religion." Ron
Rosenberger prevailed on his First Amendment claim, and the Estab-
79. See id. at 107.
80. See Baker, supra note 3, at 115.
81. Id. at 114.
82. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 824 (1995).
83. Id. at 825.
84. Id. at 825-26.
85. Id. at 827.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 828-37.
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lishment Clause "posed no insuperable barrier to the publication of an
explicitly Christian newspaper with state university funds."'
The Rosenberger decision is a prime illustration of postmodernism
because the Court discussed competing orthodoxies as if all had equal
footing. For example, the Court treated religious expression not as reli-
gion, but as speech." The crux of the Supreme Court's decision rested
on the Free Speech Clause analysis, not the Religion Clause implica-
tions. By treating the Christian newspaper's message as "speech," the
Court was essentially treating any form of religious expression as an ide-
ology that can be adequately analyzed under the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment. Additionally, religion was treated as one of many
ideologies, deserving of a place in public discourse (i.e., a public univer-
sity campus).90 An Enlightenment-minded Court would have also likely
upheld the university's policy; because, if a public school financially
supported a Christian magazine, then that would arguably be an imper-
missible establishment of religion." An Enlightenment-minded Court
would have relied on the principle of church-state separation to crush
Ron Rosenberger's dream of publishing a Christian magazine at a public
university. However, by relying on a narrow interpretation of the Estab-
lishment Clause, the Court was able to satisfy the postmodern ideal of
allowing competing orthodoxies in the public square.
The Rosenberger Court primarily relied on two cases, which empha-
sized that public institutions should provide equal access in the public
square. In Widmar v. Vincent, the Court ridiculed a decision of the Uni-
versity of Missouri at Kansas City to deny religious groups access to
school facilities after hours, when those same facilities were open to
non-religious groups. The Court rejected the notion that the university
was required to deny religious groups this benefit based on the separa-
tion of church and state.93 Instead, the Court held that the university
was required to act "impartial" and was under a duty not to "inhibit" the
advancement of religion.9 4
88. Baker, supra note 3, at 115.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. This Enlightenment-minded outrage is articulated in Justice Souter's dissent in
Rosenberger: "[The Court today, for the first time, approves direct funding of core reli-
gious activities by an arm of the State." 515 U.S. at 863 (Souter, J., dissenting).
92. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265-66 (1981).
93. Id. at 270-73.
94. Id. at 271.
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The Rosenberger Court also cited Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School District, which emphasized the same basic principles
of Widmar.9 5 In Lamb's Chapel, a religious group was denied access to a
public school's facilities after hours. 6 The Court held that once the
school opens its doors to outside organizations, it creates a limited pub-
lic forum, and cannot discriminate against religious groups on the basis
of viewpoint." Importantly, both these cases emphasized the postmo-
dern paradigm of equal access in the public square. Accordingly, both
Widmar and Lamb's Chapel are noteworthy because they introduced
slight postmodernist sensibilities and paved the way for Rosenberger and
subsequent cases.
Following Rosenberger, there is a noticeable trend of postmodern
thought as the Court handed down another case treading on the outer
boundary of what the Establishment Clause proscribes. Similar to Ro-
senberger, in Good News Club v. Milford Central School," the Court ruled
in favor of religious activity. In that case, a religious group sought to use
an elementary school immediately following the school day to teach
children Bible verses, sing songs of worship, listen to Bible stories, and
pray.99 The school objected on the basis that the religious group's ac-
tions were not protected under the Religion Clause.o Again, the Su-
preme Court analyzed this issue under the Free Speech Clause and de-
termined that the school had performed impermissible viewpoint
discrimination.'o' If the Good News Club had pursued use of the public
school facilities through a free exercise claim, then they almost certainly
would have lost.'02 Because they were able to tie their claims to free
speech and have religious expression treated like any other worldview-
based activity, they prevailed, just like Ron Rosenberger.' 03 The Court's
willingness to treat religious expression as another ideology protected by
the Free Speech Clause indicates how the Court has followed the post-
modern sensibility of protecting all competing orthodoxies in the public
square.
95. Lambs Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
96. Id. at 387-88.
97. Id. at 394-97.
98. Good News Club v. Milford C. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
99. Id. at 103.
100. Id. at 103-04.
101. Id. at 107-08.
102. Baker, supra note 3, at 118.
103. Id.
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B. Not Entirely "Postmodern"
To conclude that Rosenberger, Widmar, Lamb's Chapel, and Good
News Club were entirely driven by "postmodern" notions would be mis-
guided. In fact, these cases still embody elements of modernism. For
example, these religious groups were only allowed a place in the public
square if they played by the rules mandated by the institution. The
Court would not protect pervasively sectarian, non-compliant religious
organizations. Religious organizations could participate in public dis-
course to some degree, as long as they pursued what the reasoned con-
sensus would pursue. This concept illustrates how the government's
rules still have a significant degree of control over discourse in the pub-
lic square. A true postmodernist would support a more unrestricted
public square, free of the government's attempt to play referee and indi-
rectly force its own ideology of non-discrimination. The government's
ideology is not "competing" when it has the ability to constrain other
ideologies.
C. Following Rosenberger: Christian Legal Society vs. Public University
Undisputedly, the public university campus has become increasing-
ly diverse in the early twenty-first century. Institutions have ramped up
their efforts to make every student feel welcome by prohibiting discrimi-
nation on the basis of beliefs.'" However, "[ilf freedom of religion
means anything, it means that individuals can have whatever belief they
choose, can associate with those who share their beliefs, and can exclude
those that disagree.""' A postmodernist viewpoint recognizes that pub-
lic universities cannot withhold recognition, access, or funding to stu-
dent groups as a means of disagreeing with the group's viewpoint.
Throughout the last decade, it has become increasingly common for
public universities to dispute the membership policies of their student
groups, especially religious organizations.' Giving rise to the Supreme
104. William E. Thro, Preserving Orthodoxy on Secular Campuses: The Right of Student
Religious Organizations to Exclude Non-Believers, 250 WEST'S EDUc. L. REP. 497,
515 (2010).
105. Id. at 515-16.
106. Id. For an illustration of the widespread litigation see Christian Legal Soc. v.
Eck, 625 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (D. Mont. 2009); Every Nation Campus Ministries at San Di-
ego State Univ. v. Achtenberg, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (S.D. Cal. 2009); Univ. of Wis.-
Madison Roman Catholic Found. v. Walsh, No. 06-C-649-S, 2007 WL 1056772 (W.D.
Wis. Apr. 4, 2007); Alpha Iota Omega Christian Fraternity v. Moeser, No. 1:04-CV-
00765, 2005 WL 1720903 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 2, 2005).
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Court's recent CLS v. Martinez decision, there were two notable circuit
court decisions discussing the alleged institutional discrimination of
student religious groups on college campuses. The Seventh Circuit in
CLS v. Walker107 and the Ninth Circuit in CLS v. Kanelos ruled opposite
of each other when balancing the interests of student religious groups in
excluding members against the public university's interest in preventing
discrimination.
The facts in CLS v. Walker involved the dean of Southern Illinois
University Law School revoking the recognition of CLS as an official
student group because CLS required its members to subscribe to the
moral principles in a statement of faith." Problematically, the state-
ment of faith forbid individuals from engaging in pre-marital sexual rela-
tions, whether by homosexuals or heterosexuals." 0 The university
claimed the CLS statement of faith violated university policy and equal
opportunity laws." The Seventh Circuit ruled against the university
holding that it impermissibly infringed on CLS's freedom of associa-
tion."' The Court noted that university policy cannot "force the group
to accept members it does not desire" because that would "affect in a sig-
nificant way the group's ability to advocate.""3 The Seventh Circuit did
not decide Walker on free speech grounds, but recognized in dicta that
the university's non-discrimination policy was applied in a discriminato-
ry manner, even though it was deemed facially neutral."'
Similar to Walker, the facts in CLS v. Kane (later known as CLS v.
Martinez) involved a similar controversial "statement of faith" as the
source of the dispute."' Inconsistent with Walker, in Kane, the district
court and Ninth Circuit ruled against CLS, holding that the university's
decision to deny student organization benefits was not viewpoint dis-
107. Christian Legal Soc. v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006).
108. Christian Legal Soc. v. Kane, 319 F. App'x 645 (9th Cir. 2009), pet. for cert. filed
sub nom. Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez, No. 08-1371 (U.S. May 5, 2009). This decision
was later renamed and is commonly referred to as CLS v. Martinez. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on December 7, 2009.
109. Walker, 453 F.3d at 857-58.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 864.
113. Id. at 861 (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000)).
114. Id. at 869-70.
115. Christian Legal Soc. v. Kane, 319 F. App'x 645 (9th Cir. 2009). The underlying
facts of that case are discussed in detail infra 1(V).
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crimination." This apparent circuit split led the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari to review the matter. In light of Rosenberger, it seemed as
though the Supreme Court was going to treat the CLS statement of faith
as protected speech. At the least, a postmodernist would have predicted
such an outcome.
IV. CLS v. MARTINEZ: THE RISE OF HYPER-MODERNISM
In the summer of 2010, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
CLS v. Martinez,"' confronting the ongoing battle between student reli-
gious groups and public university policies.' The facts in Martinez are
rather simple and similar to the facts of CLS v. Walker. In 2004, CLS
applied for the privileges of a "registered student organization" at the
University of California-Hastings Law School.119 However, CLS's appli-
cation for official recognition and funding was denied because of its un-
willingness to admit into its ranks those students who did not share its
fundamental commitments, which included a rejection of homosexuality
and a strong commitment to sex only within marriage.1o To be precise,
CLS's charter only required officers and voting members to affirm the
key tenets, which include the prohibition of "unrepentant" sexual con-
duct.12' Specifically under dispute was the law school's "all-comers" pol-
icy that required all religious student organizations to admit all interest-
ed students to their ranks, regardless of any clash in belief or
worldview. 22
Justice Ginsburg drafted the majority opinion in Martinez, uphold-
ing the law school's "all-comers" policy and ruling against CLS." The
majority held that the Hastings policy was viewpoint neutral and did not
116. Id.; Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, No. C-04-04484-
JSW, 2006 WL 997217 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2006).
117. Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
118. Richard Epstein, Church and State at the Crossroads: Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 105 (2010).
119. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2974.
120. Epstein, supra note 118, at *1 (citing Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2974).
121. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2974.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2994-95. Richard Epstein noted that this decision rested upon an "uneasy
five-member coalition" consisting of two concurrences from Justices John Paul Stevens
and Anthony Kennedy. Epstein, supra note 118, at *105-06. In this case, the Enligh-
tenment-minded coalition on the Supreme Court prevailed, but surprisingly, the majori-
ty did not rely upon staunch church-state principles to rule against CLS.
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violate CLS's free speech and expression rights.14  Justice Ginsburg
noted:
CLS's conduct - not its Christian perspective - is, from Hastings' van-
tage point, what stands between the group and [registered student or-
ganization] status. In the end, as Hastings observes, "CLS is simply con-
fusing its own viewpoint-based objections to ... nondiscrimination laws
(which it is entitled to have and [to] voice) with viewpoint discrimina-
,125tion."u
In other words, the majority indicated that CLS is entitled to its own
views, but those views must conform to the views of the university.
The Court attempted to distinguish Rosenberger by concluding that
the University of Virginia, in that case, singled out the Christian news-
paper and denied funding on the basis of its religious viewpoint.12 1
However, in Martinez, the Hastings "all-comers" policy draws no distinc-
tion between views, but only restricts discriminatory views.127 The
Court's distinction is unpersuasive because, in both cases, the universi-
ties applied policies that infringe a particular viewpoint: religious ex-
pression. The dissent cited Rosenberger, Widmar, Lamb's Chapel, and
Good News Club as authority, and proclaimed that any policy that re-
stricts a religious group's freedom of speech, expression, and association
on the basis of a religious viewpoint should be struck down.1 8 In Marti-
nez, the "all-comers" policy infringed the right of CLS on the basis of its
religious viewpoint.
Justice Alito's dissent noted that the majority opinion was peculiar
because "in some instances [it] follows old precedent, in other instances
repudiates precedent, and in other instances goes beyond precedent.""'
Before, the Court had established a noticeable trend of almost always
ruling in favor of the religious group's autonomy. However, the Enligh-
tenment-minded coalition of Supreme Court justices prevailed in Marti-
nez. CLS lost in Martinez because postmodern sentiment failed them.
CLS lost because Justice Ginsburg contended that they abused their
place in the public square. Gene Edward Veith warned us of this; the
postmodernist will provide Christians with equal footing in public dis-
124. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2994-95.
125. Id. at 2994.
126. Id. at 2993.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 3009 (Alito, J., dissenting).
129. Epstein, supra note 118, at *14.
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riority over other views.13 0
130. VEITH, supra note 8, at 40.
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Interestingly, Richard Epstein's critique of Martinez exemplifies
postmodern sensibilities. Epstein is a prominent leader of the CATO In-
stitute,131 which filed an amicus brief supporting CLS in the Martinez
case. In its brief, the CATO Institute argues that CLS's right to expres-
sive association trumps any purported state interest in enforcing a school
non-discrimination policy.' Epstein noted that Justice Ginsburg
wrongly concluded that Hastings Law School should, by its "all-comers"
policy, treat all student groups as defacto common carriers.13  Instead,
"Hastings itself functions as a limited common carrier that must admit
into its ranks all groups regardless of their substantive positions.""
Epstein's critique raises the question: Who is acting intolerant? Hast-
ings or CLS? Justice Ginsburg points the finger at CLS for acting intole-
rant by excluding students who disagree with their fundamental be-
liefs.1 5 Meanwhile, Epstein points the finger at Hastings for making the
mistake of legitimizing intolerance against small and isolated religious
groups. 136
The debate regarding "toleration" is significant because the tension
illustrates how both sides of the dispute want to be viewed as "more tole-
rant." While toleration is a classic postmodern sensibility, the Martinez
Court treats toleration (i.e., non-discrimination) as the dominant ideolo-
gy. Justice Ginsburg defended the law school's "all-comers" policy for
"fostering cooperation."1 37  However, that view "presuppose[s] that or-
ganizations are allowed to maintain their separate identities, and then
explains how different groups and individuals should think about and
interact with others."3 Disagreeing with Justice Ginsburg, Epstein
stated:
131. According to its website, the CATO Institute is "a public policy research organi-
zation - a think tank - dedicated to the principles of individual liberty, limited gov-
ernment, free markets and peace. Its scholars and analysts conduct independent, nonpar-
tisan research on a wide range of policy issues." See CATO Institute,
http://www.cato.org/about.php (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
132. See Brief for CATO Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Christian
Legal Soc. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1371), 2010 WL 497337.
133. Epstein, supra note 118, at *3.
134. Id.
135. Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2994-
95 (2010).
136. Epstein, supra note 118, at *3.
137. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2990.
138. Epstein, supra note 118, at *13.
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[Tihe lesson of toleration at Hastings Law School is best achieved by let-
ting CLS go about its own business . . .. Toleration requires adopting a
live-and-let-live attitude about those with whom you disagree. It does
not require any religious group to suffer a forced surrender of essential
group characteristics, by admitting non-believers into its ranks."'
Regardless of whether Ginsburg or Epstein is correct, this focus on "tole-
ration" as a driving force, trumping the intolerant, should make a post-
modernist cringe. John Locke would also likely agree with Epstein's po-
sition that the government should tolerate the expression of religious
groups. Many argue that Locke's emphasis on toleration was intended to
allow religion to flourish, free of government intrusion.'m Ironically,
Locke's view on toleration has arguably been distorted by the Court and
used against religious groups. The notion of toleration has morphed in-
to an ideology bolstered by the Court and implemented by government
at the expense of religious expression.
While unlikely, a postmodernist may attempt to defend Martinez by
arguing that the Court's holding was justified because CLS abused its
place in the public square. Christians asserted their statement of faith,
which excluded those in disagreement with their beliefs, and pro-
nounced that staying true to their beliefs was more important than the
school's non-discrimination policy. CLS never offended the public
square and never attempted to control discourse in the public square.
Thus, it is difficult to argue that CLS abused its place.
We learn that the Martinez decision is actually hyper-modernistic
because the Court is compelling an orthodoxy of diversity, non-
discrimination, and non-commitment. The Court indicated that there is
no constitutional limit on government, if government pursues the or-
thodoxy of diversity. A hyper-modernist takes the liberal notions of
freedom and diversity, and demands these be strictly followed through-
out society. Accordingly, in the public university context, each institu-
tion should demand an orthodoxy of disbelief and relativism. This is
precisely what Hastings did in Martinez and the Supreme Court sup-
ported that position.
A postmodernist should find it objectionable that a public institu-
tion may be permitted to exclude an orthodoxy from the public square
on the basis that its viewpoint is incompatible with what is socially and
139. Id.
140. See McConnell, supra note 25, at 1431-32; James L. Underwood, Applying the
Good News Club Decision in a Manner that Maintains the Separation of Church and State in
our Schools, 47 VILL. L. REv. 281, 294 (2002) (citing LOCKE, supra note 20, at 18).
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politically acceptable. In a true postmodern world, I can be entirely
convinced of my position and no institution can tell me that my view-
point is wrong. In a hyper-modern world, I cannot be so sure of my po-
sition. In this case, CLS stood firm on its position and communicated to
the school: "our beliefs are certain and we will not amend our views to
be consistent with the school's viewpoint." From the school's point-of-
view, and the Court for that matter, a group's views should be amenda-
ble or relative to the school's views.
While the Martinez decision offends postmodernism and more ac-
curately reflects the modern, it does not resemble classical liberalism.
The watchword for liberalism is freedom, and that includes freedom
from tradition, religion, and institution.'4 ' The classic liberal would say,
"Hand's Off! Don't try to control what I think; don't try to control what I
believe; don't try to control what I do."142 To some degree, liberalism is
anti-institutional.4 4 Accordingly, a classic liberal would strongly disag-
ree with Martinez and oppose any institutional constraints on CLS. It is
safe to say that John Locke would be highly offended by the Martinez
decision, especially in light of the Court's discussion of "toleration.""
The liberal/modern notion of freedom is not what makes Martinez a hy-
per-modern reflection; instead, it is the affirmation of one ideology as
the dominant ideology that makes the decision hyper-modern.
The Martinez decision should sound strikingly similar to the mod-
em notion that religion must play within the bounds of reason. The
Court concluded that government only is required to recognize and fund
those student groups that comport with its preferred orthodoxy. If rea-
son was the orthodoxy of the modern era, then non-discrimination is the
orthodoxy of the hyper-modern era. According to the Martinez Court,
these student religious groups must play within the bounds of the gov-
ernment's mandated orthodoxy: non-discrimination. A true postmo-
dernist would never impose a hegemonic orthodoxy in the public
square. The so-called rise in postmodern jurisprudence was derailed this
141. SmiTH, supra note 72, at 98.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990
(2010). The Court recognized that Hastings Law School's anti-discrimination policy was
reasonable because it encouraged "tolerance." Id. Additionally, the Court favorably re-
ferred to the school's policy as "dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of
prohibition." Id. at 2986. While the Court acknowledged that the government may be
required to tolerate instances of private discrimination, it was not required to support
such discrimination. Id. (citing Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 463 (1973)).
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past summer when the Supreme Court handed down Martinez. It seems
as though the so-called rise in postmodernism may be over-stated and
the emergence of hyper-modernism may be under-stated.
V. CONCLUSION
Compared to postmodernism, hyper-modernism is not as friendly
to religious freedom. Christians should be concerned about the
precedent set by Martinez. As one critic observed:
Hastings-like policies intentionally sterilize one of the few remaining fer-
tile fields for discourse - student organizations - for the sake of mar-
ginalizing religion. In doing so, these schools shoot themselves in the
foot at a time when they can ill afford the injury. Hastings, and like-
minded administrations, who adopt policies that restrict all speech in the
name of free speech, gut the conscience of the law school . . . . 14'
Hyper-modern thought will allow for the expansion of a government
ideology that will impose its will upon religious groups. The govern-
ment will be permitted to say "play by our rules, or else . . . ." For this
reason, Christians and other religious groups should prefer the postmo-
dern public square to hyper-modernism.
It seems as though Christians find themselves in a challenging posi-
tion after the Martinez decision. On the one hand, if Christians assert
their values too forcefully in the public square, then the government will
constrain them. On the other hand, if Christians do not seek hegemony,
then someone else will. This is why Stanley Fish encourages Christians
to take advantage of their newfound place in the public square and "im-
pose their will after attaining influence."' Inevitably, competing ortho-
doxies will seek cultural domination."' This is exactly what happened
in Martinez. The Court reinforced an expansion and domination of the
State's ideology at the expense of CLS. To make matters worse, CLS was
not even "imposing its will" on other students in the public square. CLS
was not jockeying its ideology as superior to others. Instead, it was the
State that overreached by establishing a super-text: its "all-comers" poli-
cy. And as we know, the establishment of a super-text is completely
contradictory to postmodern thought.
145. Posting of Michael P. Schutt to Redeeming Law Blog, Some "Cultural" Implica-
tions of CLS v. Martinez, http://redeeminglaw.blogspot.com/2010/09/some-cultural-
implications-of-cls-v.html (Sept. 15, 2010).
146. Fish, supra note 78, at 929.
147. See id.
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After Martinez, we should seriously question whether postmodern
sensibilities will continue to provide breathing room for religious free-
dom in the public square. If the hyper-modern notion of ideological he-
gemony continues to gain traction, then the prospects of religious free-
dom in America may be compromised. As government continues to
expand, its voice will grow more dominant in the public square, slowly
eroding the postmodern "competing orthodoxy" era. A hyper-modern
majority on the Court will continue to allow government-imposed or-
thodoxies to stifle other orthodoxies in the public square. This should
cause concern for Christians and proponents of religious freedom.
Timothy P. Lendino*
* This Author would like to thank Professor Richard T. Bowser, who challenged him
to write this Comment and provided invaluable guidance.
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